A senior Philippine Navy official has outlined China’s extensive militarization of approximately 3,000 hectares of reclaimed land in the South China Sea, including bases constructed on artificial islands within Manila’s exclusive economic zone.
Analysts say that Beijing’s establishment of military bases in this heavily contested area over the past 13 years presents a significant strategic challenge for the Philippines, as the country lacks the military capacity to counter such developments.
China’s construction of islands in the South China Sea addresses a mix of economic and military issues in line with historical precedent.
Contrary to media portrayals, China’s primary economic motivation in the South China Sea is not the resources beneath the sea those are not particularly significant.
The main reason is that the modern Chinese state is highly dependent on maritime trade. Looking at trade volumes, China is effectively an island nation because it doesn’t engage much in land-based trade with its neighbors.
Unlike the U.S., China is only connected by land with 1 out of its top 10 trading partners, which is Hong Kong. Furthermore, China has 7 of the world’s top 10 busiest ports, while the U.S. does not have a single port in the top 10.
Most of the $5 trillion in trade passing through the South China Sea, as frequently mentioned in the media, is either inbound to or outbound from China. Many news reports overlook this fact. The islands in the South China Sea help China protect its freedom of trade.
If a nation were to blockade China by stopping trade from moving past Singapore, China’s economy would be in serious trouble. Japan conducted a study on the economic impact of redirecting Japanese trade from the Malacca Strait to the Sunda Strait and found it would only result in a minor price increase.
China cannot do this because the only power capable and willing to blockade China is the U.S. Unlike Japan and South Korea, China is not an ally of the U.S. and cannot reroute trade past the First Island Chain if blockaded.
This is also why China has been working to build railways to Moscow and Berlin through Central Asia. This effort is intended to mitigate the impact of losing maritime routes to China’s trading partners by diversifying.
On the military front, the U.S. has gradually shifted from a strategy of cooperation to hedging and, under Obama, to outright containment. The Pivot to Asia was the exclamation mark on this highly antagonistic strategy pursued by the U.S. in the Pacific.
China is contained within the First Island Chain a chain formed by South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and more recently, Vietnam .
This chain prevents the Chinese navy from venturing into open sea without constant monitoring and shadowing by the U.S. navy. In the modern era of information warfare, knowing precisely where your adversary’s forces are is invaluable.
Additionally, surveillance ships collect the radar and sonar signatures of the ships they monitor, allowing the U.S. to easily identify Chinese ships and target them with missiles, aircraft, and other assets in the event of war.
While these actions are not illegal, they are certainly not in good faith. They signal to China that, regardless of what the U.S. government says, the U.S. navy views China primarily as an enemy. This ongoing tension is a significant issue between the two nations.
This situation would not be as critical if not for the fact that the First Island Chain also prevents Chinese nuclear submarines from hiding in the ocean, as they cannot pass undetected. Hidden nuclear submarines are crucial for second-strike capabilities, which underpin the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction .
If Chinese nuclear submarines cannot remain hidden, they cannot retaliate against a nuclear strike on their nation, making them vulnerable to a potential first-strike nuclear policy. The U.S. has refused to rule out a preemptive nuclear strike, increasing Chinese anxiety.
The South China Sea islands play into this by establishing control over a sea area deep enough to conceal submarines. Unlike the open ocean, China still has direct access via Hainan Island without heavy U.S. surveillance.
This is evident when you realize that China’s main submarine base is in Sanya, located at the southern tip of Hainan Island. To establish control over a sea area, there must either be ships constantly patrolling or an airfield in the area.
Airfields are preferred because they can cover a larger area more quickly. However, the South China Sea has only one natural island capable of supporting an airfield—Taiping Island, controlled by Taiwan.
All other islands with airfields have achieved this through land reclamation. Decades ago, Vietnam and the Philippines began occupying South China Sea islands and conducting land reclamation to build airfields and facilities.
China showed remarkable restraint during this period and only protested diplomatically. When China realized no one was listening, it had to join the process. By that time, all the large natural islands had already been occupied by Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other ASEAN nations. The only option left was to build entirely artificial islands that could host airfields.
China builds the islands because they address fundamental economic and military security problems. That’s why China insists it will not compromise on South China Sea sovereignty.
